

Message Text

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MARR, JA

SUBJECT: FY 1979 DEFENSE REPORT

JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE

1 (U) JAPANESE DEFENSE ATTACHES HERE IN WASHINGTON WERE BRIEFED ON SELECTED PORTIONS OF THE FY 1979 DEFENSE REPORT ON 23 JANUARY 1978. POLITICAL COUNSELORS ARIMA AND UMEZ WERE PROVIDED WITH EXTRACTS OF DEFENSE REPORT ON 30 JANUARY 1978.

2. (C) SECTIONS OF THE REPORT SPECIFICALLY CONCERNING EAST ASIA ARE REPEATED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION. THE ENTIRE UNCLASSIFIED REPORT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE HERE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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ARIMA VOICED CONCERN OVER THE PHRASE "... AND HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WAYS TO PARTIALLY REDUCE THE COST OF MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN". HE EXPECTS CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN THE DIET OVER THIS STATED U.S. POSITION. ACCORDING TO ARIMA, THE GOJ WILL PROBABLY RESPOND TO INTERPELLATION ON THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT THIS U.S. STATEMENT REFERS TO THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED LABOR

COST SHARING TALKS AND THIS LIKE ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS IS

IN SOFA FRAMEWORK. WE HAVE AGREED NOT TO DISAGREE WITH THIS GOJ INTERPRETATION; BUT HAVE ALSO ASKED ARIMA THAT THE JAPANESE NOT SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE COST SHARING TALKS HAVE COME TO AN END. AS ARIMA KNOWS WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUATION OF INFORMAL TALKS ON COST SHARING.

A. SUMMARY, GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, EAST ASIA

"THERE IS A RATHER CLEAR DIVIDING LINE IN EUROPE BETWEEN FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES. THE DANGERS ARE LESS SHARPLY DEFINED IN ASIA. SOVIET FORCES IN ASIA ARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT CHINA. NORTH KOREA CONTINUES TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES RELATIVE TO SOUTH KOREA, BUT THE LONG-TERM OVERALL TRENDS CLEARLY FAVOR THE SOUTH. THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REMAINS OBSCURE, AND THE ULTIMATE INTENTIONS OF VIETNAM CONTINUE TO BE UNCERTAIN.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESIDENT HAS REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO A POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND FULFILL ALL OUR TREATY OBLIGATIONS. THE PLANNED WITHDRAWAL OF THE 2ND U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION FROM SOUTH KOREA IN NO WAY ALTERS THAT
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COMMITMENT.

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE AGGRESSION IN KOREA. WITH CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION, WE PLAN TO AUGMENT THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN GROUND FORCES. THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE 2ND DIVISION WILL REMAIN DEPLOYED IN KOREA UNTIL AFTER 1980. THE SEVENTH FLEET, A MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH ITS ORGANIC AIR WING, AND THREE USAF LAND-BASED TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS WILL CONTINUE ON STATION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, INCLUDING ONE IN KOREA.

CONTINUATION OF THE CLOSE U.S.-JAPANESE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN STABILITY IN ASIA. WE SUPPORT JAPANESE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THEIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, PARTICULARLY THEIR RECENTLY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO AUGMENT THEIR AIR DEFENSE AND ASW CAPABILITIES."

B. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES, EAST ASIA.

"WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN ASIA BY MAINTAINING FORCES DEPLOYED FORWARD IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. THESE FORCES ENHANCE THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES AND PROVIDE AN IM-

PORTANT ELEMENT OF SECURITY TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. WE ARE ALSO WORKING TO IMPROVE U.S.-JAPANESE DEFENSE CO-OPERATION, AND HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WAYS TO PARTIALLY REDUCE THE COST OF MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN.

EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) ARE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY BECAUSE CHINA IS A STRATEGIC COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SUCH RELATIONS WILL STRENGTHEN THE INTEREST OF THE PRC IN REGIONAL STABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE NORMALIZATION OF
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U.S.-PRC RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE REMAINS A MAJOR GOAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION."

C. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND DEFENSE, APPROACHES TO PLANNING THE SECURITY OF ASIA.

"WITHIN THIS DECADE WE HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED OUR ASIAN DEPLOYMENTS, BASE STRUCTURE, AND THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT OUR ASIAN DEFENSE POSTURE. THESE POLICY CHANGES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIA OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN TO TWENTY YEARS.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND THE FOCUSING OF PRC FORCES ON THE SOVIET PROBLEM HAVE LED TO A REASSESSMENT ON OUR PART OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A U.S.-PRC CONFLICT. AS A RESULT WE NO LONGER PLAN FORCES ON THE BASIS OF A U.S.-PRC CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH A RESPONSIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE AS WELL AS NUCLEAR FORCES PROVIDE HEDGES AGAINST A POTENTIALLY THREATENING CHINA. TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR FORCES ARE ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA, THEY SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE ITS PACIFIC FLEET AND OUR DEFENSE POLICY FOR ASIA INCREASINGLY EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO COUNTER THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT. SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A WAR IN EUROPE COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY WAR OR THE THREAT OF WAR IN ASIA, WITH THE PRINCIPAL DANGER COMING FROM SOVIET ATTACKS ON OUR NAVAL FORCES AND OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

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NORTH KOREAN FORCES HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY MODERNIZED SINCE 1968. HOWEVER, SOUTH KOREA HAS BEEN GROWING IN STRENGTH AS WELL. SHE NOW HAS TWICE THE POPULATION AND SEVERAL TIMES THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE NORTH. THIS EXPANSION, AND THE CONTINUING SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, HAVE LED US TO BEGIN A FURTHER MODIFICATION OF THE U.S. DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTH KOREA.

IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PLANNED MODIFICATION DOES NOT ENTAIL EITHER A SUDDEN OR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA OR A REDUCTION IN OUR SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO KOREA, JAPAN, AND OUR OTHER ASIAN ALLIES. IN FACT, U.S. TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN KOREA ARE TO BE STRENGTHENED, ASSISTANCE TO THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES IS TO BE INCREASED, AND THE PHASING-OUT OF THE 2ND U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION IS TO BE CAREFULLY PACED OVER A FOUR-TO-FIVE YEAR PERIOD, WHILE OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC ARE TO BE HELD AT CURRENT LEVELS.

SUCH A GRADUAL AND CAUTIOUS CHANGE SHOULD BE MUCH MORE CONDUCIVE TO STABILITY IN ASIA THAN AN ABRUPT REVERSAL OF POLICY THAT WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESULT FROM FRUSTRATION WITH AN OBSOLETE STATUS QUO. THE UNITED STATES IS MORE THAN WILLING -- AS IT HAS DEMONSTRATED FOR 30 YEARS -- TO BEAR A SHARE OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY BURDEN COMMENSURATE WITH ITS WEALTH AND STAKE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. BUT WHERE ALLIES HAVE DEVELOPED THE BASIC STRENGTHS NECESSARY TO GREATER SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN DEFENSE -- AND WHERE THEY ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONFRONTED BY ONE OF THE SUPERPOWERS -- THE BURDEN OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY MUST UNDERGO SOME ADJUSTMENT. OTHERWISE, SECURITY CANNOT BE TRULY COLLECTIVE, AND IT WILL NOT ENDURE.

WE HAVE MADE A BEGINNING TOWARD A MORE MODERN AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. THE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS REQUIRED TO IMPROVE
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SECURITY -- AND STABILITY -- STILL FURTHER ARE DISCUSSED IN THE SECTIONS THAT FOLLOW."

D. DEFENSE POLICY, POLICY FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, THE CONDITIONS OF DETERRENCE, SEA CONTROL.

"I SHOULD ADD THAT, WHILE WE ARE QUITE UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE MIGHT EVOLVE, WE WOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN NAVAL AND OTHER FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AT ALL TIME. WE NEED THEM THERE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO FULFILL OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS, BUT THAT WOULD NOT BE THEIR ONLY FUNCTION. THEY MIGHT WELL SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO THE SPREAD OF THE CONFLICT; THEY

COULD POSSIBLY IMMOBILIZE OTHER FORCES DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR SIZE; AND THEY WOULD -- INSUFFICIENT QUALITY-- ENABLE US, TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES, TO KEEP THE SEA LANES OPEN TO JAPAN AND KOREA IN THE EVENT THAT DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL."

E. DEFENSE POLICY, POLICY FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, THE ADEQUACY OF THE POSTURE, NORTHEAST ASIA.

"OUR STRATEGIC CONCEPT CALLS FOR THE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH ONLY ONE MAJOR CONTINGENCY AT A TIME. WHAT WE PROVIDE IN THE FORM OF GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES TO HELP OUR ALLIES HALT A WARSAW PACT ATTACK IN EUROPE SHOULD BE MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH ANY FORESEEABLE CONTINGENCY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR RAPID REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (PARTICULARLY IN THE FORM OF EXPANDED STRATEGIC AIRLIFT) TO DEAL WITH PACT BUILDUPS IN EUROPE, THE IMPROVEMENT SHOULD SUFFICE TO MANAGE ANY REQUIREMENTS WE MIGHT HAVE IN THE FAR EAST. EVEN AT THE PEAK OF THE KOREAN WAR, OUR DEPLOYMENTS NEVER EXCEEDED EIGHT DIVISIONS AND 12 LAND-BASED TACTICAL
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AIR WINGS -- WELL BELOW WHAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

IT IS OUR POLICY, NONETHELESS, TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, NOT ONLY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR INTEREST AND PRESENCE IN THE REGION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE WE WOULD WANT TO DETER ANY RECKLESS ACTIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA AT A TIME WHEN CRISIS THREATENED IN EUROPE AND OUR MAIN FORCES WERE ORIENTED TOWARD NATO. IN ADDITION, WHILE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION IS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF PRESENT AND POTENTIAL SOUTH KOREAN GROUND CAPABILITIES AND OUR OWN NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE ALLOCATION OF OUR LIMITED NUMBER OF DIVISIONS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE POWERFUL SUPPORT TO THE ROK (REPUBLIC OF KOREA), TO HELP DETER A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK. THE PRINCIPAL FORCES IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE WITHIN THE WESTERN PACIFIC WILL BE NINE SQUADRONS OF LAND-BASED FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT (OF WHICH THREE SQUADRONS WILL BE BASED IN KOREA), THE TWO BRIGADES OF THE THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, INCLUDING ITS ORGANIC AIR, IN JAPAN (OKINAWA), AND THE 20-25 COMBATANTS OF THE SEVENTH FLEET, WHICH WILL INCLUDE TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

WE WILL ALSO MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO REINTRODUCE ADDITIONAL COMBAT FORCES, INCLUDING THE 2ND DIVISION AND A LARGER COMPLEMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTERS, SHOULD CONDITIONS SO DICTATE. WITH JAPAN AS THE NORTHERN ANCHOR, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAN A STRONG DEFENSE PERIMETER IN THE WESTERN

PACIFIC WITH TACTICAL AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AND ONLY A
MODEST COMMITMENT OF GROUND FORCES. THE PROGRAMMED FORCE
STRUCTURE AND POSTURE WOULD PERMIT US TO DO SO." VANCE

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